Thursday, March 19, 2020

The Curious Case of the Criminal Curriculum Vitae

 

Executive Summary

The Tailored Intelligence Team at Prevailion has detected a new campaignat least a facet of which is currently activedubbed The Curious Case of the Criminal Curriculum Vitae.

In this newly discovered campaign, threat actors targeted German companies with trojanized emails disguised as job applicants. While this activity appeared to be geographically based in Germany, these same techniques could easily be applied to any organization.

Once the email attachment was activated, a company's secure credentials and credit card data could be transmitted covertly to the threat actors. In the 2019 iterations of this attack, the attackers used commercial tools to encrypt all the users files, which suggests this recent activity could also lay the groundwork for an infection vector into the company's network to encrypt files.

In a second cluster of activity used a more sophisticated approach. They fetched an instance of Netsupport, a commercial remote administration tool, hosted on a user’s Google Drive account. This enabled a host of actions, including remote file transfer, screen captures, and even voice recordings. Since these threat actors are abusing legitimate binaries such as GPG tools and NetSupport, they are unlikely to be removed by traditional antivirus software.   

Based upon the overlap in infrastructure between these two clusters, we associate these clusters of activity to the same threat actor with high confidence. Upon further inspection of the second cluster samples, we were able to correlate it to known TA505 activity based upon the digital signature used to sign the binary.

Technical Details

Cluster 1 Activity


Threat actors have continued to rely upon business email compromise (BEC) to initially infect their victims. This technique is particularly hard to defend against when malicious emails mimic normal business interactions. In this particular case the threat actor impersonated an applicant who sought a job and attached a trojanized version of a Curriculum Vitae (or CV). The sample below was then sent to the human resources department at German-speaking businesses. All observed source email addresses in this case were created through vodafonemail.de.

Image of the malicious email sent to victims in January 2020

The message above roughly translates to:

Dear Sirs and Madames,
I am enclosing my CV in tabular form.
For further questions I am gladly at your disposal.
Friendly greetings

Leon Jager

If the victim clicked on the CV file, lebensaluf_2020_1_7.iso, an embedded Microsoft shortcut (.lnk) file will initiate and run a PowerShell script from the new host. The script begins by reaching out to a threat actor controlled IP address (hxxp://194.36.189[.]215/) to download two files, the first was a copy of rar.exe, and the second was a rar compressed folder named “dmnn.rar”. The first file - rar.exe - is a legitimate binary, used to decompress and compress data files. In this case, it is utilized to decompress the second data file, “dmnn.rar”.

Once decompressed, the dmnn.rar file contained three files named:
      Lebenslauf_2020_1_7.jpeg
      Dmn.bat
      Sqlite3.exe.

The aforementioned lnk file would first display the image file “lebenslauf_2020_1_7.jpeg”, likely in an attempt to avoid suspicion among the victims. 

Image of the Lebenslauf_2020_1_7.jpeg, as it would appear to victim

Next, the Microsoft lnk file will start the “dmn.bat” file using PowerShell. This dmn.bat is rather large, so in order to make it easier to understand, we will describe it in three parts. The first part changed the active console code to “Multilingual” (Latin I) so the code will run regardless of the environment configurations. This first segment enumerated the host machine:
      Determine all the programs names installed on the machine,
      Version of the programs,
      Date the programs were installed,
      Determine the computer’s name,
      Determine the computer’s domain.

The script then proceeds to generate a string of eight random characters, likely as a unique identifier for each workstation. If the computer name and domain are not the same, it sends that information along with the unique identifier to the threat actor controlled C2 located at URI hxxp://194.36.189[.]215/firstga990.php 

The second part of the script attempted to gather saved credentials, cookies, and credit cards. Specifically, it looks for the following information:
      use the sqlite3.exe to obtain saved cookies, login data, and web data (such as credit card numbers) from Google Chrome,
      It would attempt to grab saved login passwords as well as cookies from ThunderBird, Mozilla, and Edge applications
      Kill all task hosts and dll hosts processes
      Enumerate and harvest outlook credentials.

 
Image showing the process obtained saved information from Chrome browser

Once all the saved credentials were obtained, it wrote the output into the “safsff3f” directory. That directory is then compressed using rar and renamed as the aforementioned unique identifier. The newly compressed file was then sent back to the threat actor controlled C2, specifically the URI “hxxp://194.36.189[.]215/ris.php”

Lastly it created a scheduled task with the same name as the unique identifier. The task runs every minute, transmitting the unique identifier back to the C2 - likely as a heartbeat beacon. Finally, the bat file will delete all the files that were downloaded, created, and modified from the host machine. While this walkthrough is for the campaign that occurred on January 17th, 2020, we have observed these same techniques being used back until July of 2019.

GPG Ransomware from June 2019 Strain 

Once we analyzed the aforementioned samples, we discovered a similar rar file from June of 2019 that included a ransomware component. Like the previous operations, this one began with a file named “Lebenslauf_2019_6_6.iso” which contained an embedded Microsoft lnk file from June 2019. This Microsoft lnk file is almost identical to the one from January 2020.

Images showing the lexicon similarities between the iso files

The Microsoft link file again obtains both a rar executable and a rar compressed folder. Once unpacked, this folder contained the following files:
      Brg.brg, which contains a public 2048 bit RSA key
      Brk.bat, a batch script to encrypted stored files
      Sh.vbs, visual basic script to delete all shadow copies as system
      Lebensaluaf_2019_6_6, an image file,
      Gpg.exe, GPG executable
      Gpgconf.exe, support file for GPG tools
      Libassuan-0.dll, support file for GPG tools         
      Libgcrypt-20.dll, support file for GPG tools
      Libgpg-error-0.dll, support file for GPG tools   
      Libnpth-0.dll, support file for GPG tools    
      Libsqlite3-0.dll, support file for GPG tools  
      Zlib1.dll, support file for GPG tools

The main difference between this example and 2019 strain, was the inclusion of the GPG suite files. The batch file would encrypt all the drives on the local machine using the public GPG key “brg.brg”. Next it will compress the files and send some host based data to the email address [email protected]

Image of the malicious batch file

It would then display the following message to the victim, please note this is a verbatim copy of the message:
 "ATTENTION!"
"All important files and information on this comuter (documents, databases, etc.) will be decrypted using a RSA cryptographic algorithm"
"Without special software decoding a single file with the help of the most powerful computers will take about a 20 years."
"contact an expert  on e-mail: [email protected] or [email protected]"

The visual basic script proceeds to delete the shadow copy of the files as “system,” using Windows Management Instrumentation. The files that were in the compressed folder are deleted, and following that a web request is sent to the URI "hxxp://185.106.120[.]31/ok"

During our investigation, we were able to identify another folder with the ransomware strain, containing file names that indicate it was from May of 2019. This folder once again contained GPG keys and a public key that is used to encrypt all the local files. There were only a few small differences - the first is that the encrypting functions were written in visual basic instead of as a batch file. In this sample, the batch file simply contained a short script to delete all the downloaded files. Despite the damages this compressed folder could cause, we noticed it had a relatively low detection rate.

Virustotal detection rate for compressed tog.rar file, containing GPG ransomware script

The second difference were the email addresses used to contact the threat actor: blklock{at}airmail.cc and hopionion123{at}protonmail.com. Anecdotally, we found a post on an Eset forum where someone claimed to be victimized by this threat actor. We correlated these events based upon the same email address being found in the ransomware message that stated they should contact blklock{at}airmail.cc - from a user in Germany. While this first cluster of activity appeared to be geographically based in Germany, these same techniques could easily be applied to any organization looking to recruit new applicants.

Cluster 2 - “REKT” and NetSupport Remote Admin Tool

Overlap between with a Remote Administration Tool 

Once we identified the C2 nodes that were used to host the malicious compressed rar files, we noticed that they also hosted executable files. In the recent campaign of February 2020, the threat actor used the C2 node, 194.36.189[.]215, to host both the malicious rar folder and the executable, named rrr.zzz, on the same day according to Virustotal.

Virustotal screenshot with both the CV rar and the new sample being hosted on the same date

Upon further examination of the C2 used in the January campaign, 185.244.150[.]143, also hosted a variant of the same executable, “fnb.111”. Based upon the infrastructure overlap in two separate cases, we assess with high confidence that the same threat actors who were responsible for the “Curriculum Vitae'' attack were associated with this new agent.

The Rekt Loader 

Luckily one of the files, rrr.zzz, still had the debug strings which aided us in our efforts to better understand the agent. For example, we were able to extract the following PDB string:
            "C:\\Users\\Андрей\\Desktop\\readme\\proj\\tst - копия\\Debug\\rekt.pdb"

This led us to believe that the threat actors named this particular loader “rekt”. Not to be confused with the ransomware REKTlocker. The sample was written in c and c plus plus in visual studio 2017. The primary purpose of this loader was to download additional payloads. The samples contacted three unique URLs, all of which were hosted on Google Drive. It used a hard-coded user agent string in order to contact Gdrive. 
            Mozilla / 5.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; InfoPath.1)

2nd Stage - NetSupport

Once the rekt loader contacted the three Google Drive URLs, it downloads the following files:
      7zip.exe, a benign program used to compressed/decompress files
      A batch file
      A password-protected 7zip file

The rekt loader would then run the batch file; this batch file utilized the 7zip executable to decompress the folder and entered the requisite password. Once decompressed the files were redirected to the directory “%APPDATA%”. Afterward, it would add a “Run” registry key for persistence to start “host.exe”. The registry key modified was HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.
Next, it would start the host.exe file that was downloaded and following completion, kill the rundll32.exe files, change the %TEMP% directory and finally delete the batch file, and the 7zip executable.

Image of the batch file hosted on Google Drive

The host.exe file was identified as NetSupport; Netsupport is a commercially available software program that offers remote desktop software to customers. Since this is a commercially available product, it was a signed windows binary, making it unlikely to be flagged by antivirus products. While this tool, and those like it, were intended to be used as authorized administratives and information technology staff they can also be abused by nefarious actors. Once this tool is deployed it provides the following capabilities:
      remotely transferring files
      geo-location of the infected machine
      Ability to screenshots,
      Remotely turn on the microphone to capture audio.

The only file that appeared to be modified by the threat actor was client32.ini, where the threat actors were able to enter their own gateway address as hxxp://23.227.207[.]138:12233. 

Correlations to Prior Reporting

Once we identified the Rekt loader, we began to look for other variants of this sample. We identified an older variant from 2019, although we highly suspect there are likely additional samples. The sample from April 2019 was hosted on a compromised domain, hxxp://juristlex[.]com/photo/photo88326635[.]scr. Our evaluation showed that it appeared to be very similar to the agent from 2020.

One big difference was that this particular sample was signed with a digital signature from “Allo’ Ltd”. The company named “Allo’ Ltd” appeared to be a convenience store, or bodega, in the United Kingdom that closed in 2018. Searching on the properties of of that digital signature, we identified two “flawwed ammy” trojans. The digital signature used to sign two “flawwed ammy” trojans was referenced in a report by the South Korean FSI-Cert report, released earlier this year on TA505 activity. Both the flawwed ammy signature and the one used on the 2019 rekt sample referenced the same company, same address and expired on the same day at the same time. All three hashes and the digital signature serial number can be found below in the IOC section. We assess it was highly unlikely that another actor would impersonate the same organization to obtain a digital signatures for binaries, therefore we correlate the Rekt agent and the C2 nodes used to host them to TA505 with moderate confidence.

Digital Signature for the 2019 Rekt sample on the left, Flawwed Ammy sample on the right

Operation overview showing overlap between campaigns

When we analyzed the TTPs associated with this second cluster of activity, we observed similarities to reports by both Palo Alto and FireEye. The strongest correlation was with the Palo Alto report, where they observed the NetSupport RAT being deployed, and then observed it communicating with a hard-coded IP address ending in “/fakeurl.hml”. The one difference they observed was NetSupport being downloaded by a PowerSploit module, whereas we observed it being downloaded from the rekt loader. There were also some similarities between this campaign and a FireEye report, where they observed a threat actor using a benign version of 7zip, and a batch file that contained a password to decompress a folder containing NetSupport. In the FireEye report, the victims were compromised by visiting water holed websites.

Conclusion

This entity has achieved a high level of success due to their ability to abuse legitimate binaries for nefarious purposes. Two examples of this are the use of GPG tools to encrypt all the files on a machine; and employing a legitimate remote systems administration tool that already has all the functionality they need, while reducing the risk of being detected. Since the binary was signed, even if it was detected by an anti-virus engine, it has great potential to mistakenly be ignored as software that was intentelly installed by the network administrator.

In order to protect against TA505 and BEC in general, we recommend using an email security solution. End users should regularly update their antivirus product of choice, particularly on high-risk users who are opening files from untrusted sources. In order to protect a corporate environment against ransomware attacks, the corporate network should be segmented to impede attackers' ability to spread laterally once they gain access. Strong passwords should be used for all corporate accounts, along with a password manager. For guidance on how to create strong passwords, click here.    

Prevailion has shared our findings, including file samples and indicators of compromise, in this report with Cyber Threat Alliance members. The CTA uses this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers and to systematically disrupt malicious cyber actors. For more information on the Cyber Threat Alliance, visit www.cyberthreatalliance.org.

Indicators of Compromise 

Cluster 1 Activity - 2020 Strain
Campaign 0
Lebenslauf.eml:c15509032984f5716c86318f6fe8947bb040a7a3ff3b0996b4be2a763a1cb5aa
Lebenslauf_2020_1_7.iso:
eafe495e925747358f0d9d2081c492e70d6e427763e51a9835c8e8bb8b976ff1
Lebenslauf_2020_1_7.jpeg.lnk:
e3cd6f18cd180ec891ad0d93a7ee957fdf2ce83287abd1d0dfd1783a9c54a3fd
URL:hxxp://194.36.189[.]215/rar.exe
URL:hxxp://194.36.189[.]215/dmnn.rar
Rar.exe: 5a0898b193b27b8b962c9519d756f0631b62a6a0658a676ffc84744edbff0e10
Dmnn.rar:3383c2133f6a11f5a7d52499f2737291466be7400fd108eaf46215eb74b77e2b
Lebenslauf_2020_1_7.jpeg:
dad4776d9458167fb081256b90273df5ac24ff6a99fb51718b08e6faba1b0691
Sqlite3.exe:2e162d331c2475e0ba39cea969e0473896d3ff5e88cc92605ff2e24da3920768
Dmn.bat:fdfb021dd60ef9fba36e82c4d4b1f4ca255ce93f9d11cd13765c3829d4b6f833
hxxp://194.36.189[.]215/firstga990.php 
hxxp://194.36.189[.]215/ris.php

Campaign 1
lebenslauf_2020_1_7.iso:
113258dc930029951d6a006d247caba5630643f3bc1e3e37e10edf36e192565f
lnk:b6d8bea34d2973708fcf48d9af375cc7da30e46fb0028568ea997b2a6d80ae98
hxxp://185.244.150[.]143/rar.exe
hxxp://185.244.150[.]143/dmnn.rar
Dmnn.rar:bc7fc774d0ad59744719d0032812056674ebfded7263c46ab417bd9669538861
URI:hxxp://185.244.150[.]143/firstga990.php

Campaign 2
Eml:e7b38d68426a83681caf08076527c5e692551611c512de200318ae227b107a2f
Lebenslauf_2020_1_7.iso:
19226ce95e9767daec63a903167532cdaae9e02495c003ade68c702b776c1288
lebenslauf_2020_1_7.jpeg.lnk:
3c2efe675c184a63bac6d427923942098e87ae0861c9515397190546b4f91366
Uri:hxxp://185.244.150[.]153/rar.exe
Uri:hxxp://185.244.150[.]153/zit.rar
Zit.rar:7c7f00b85119f8b5cde59ce2b566450723d6f990583c820b6417a6fd86a85dae
C2:hxxp://185.244.150[.]153/firstga990.php

Campaign 3
Eml:652711a83d3b558b6d258e7f93b6a9013c73236a193b6e7b2dbf8aa0054151ab
Eml:8b325b8755e9238a029bff55faf9ff2c88ab5d9c89619f2f2095030418cfa4fc
Lebenslauf_2019_11_20.iso:
2662843a571ee279313ca6d858486e3963a37d41580fe410fd06b4979dc5cbaf
cb4f25c610205ffce4d191f07ffc003272a6d82441c6eedf7f4ca6ff0d4f0828
lebenslauf_2019_11_20.jpeg.lnk:
76640f5b3b211c83992ab13c2e07891d114f81b6e24a55254ae0b6ba17a868be
hxxp://185.183.96[.]54/rar.exe
hxxp://185.183.96[.]54/htn.rar
htn.rar:88f6b490c212c836277d49164f6358587a72148a29c3c2cd20d623b00842f3de
URI:hxxp://185.183.96[.]54/firstga990.php

Campaign 4
Lebenslauf_2019_10_6.iso:
96dd2b60236ef7b0c9947e24b74797b4ccaf3f5dc6e07997caa72e21c8cd70cc
lebenslauf_2019_10_6.jpeg.lnk:
398e4653969a829d68a52159919cbd3e4b277e65cc7cb55e439e27cd8a3e9651
Uri:hxxp://185.141.27.172/rar.exe
Uri:hxxp://185.141.27.172/zirr.rar

Campaign 5
eml:80c0c506219df033cff002f4affa858a386ef1ba7840de15f2d909fc4530dce9
lebenslauf_2019_9_6.iso
f35bef883bdc36d54c987643eb9220e10245f81fcfde6e12870c2a580f6f83cc
lebenslauf_2019_9_6.img.lnk
36060b9bf31679e202dba410765ef0865b4af31e9885abe315f9c3d8c4f099f8
Uri:hxxp://185.141.27.250/rar.exe
Uri:hxxp://185.141.27.250/tripok.rar
tripok.rar
35bcd0dff8a01b1065ca0a5de7eb3e53eb10ec1569489c89cd1008a176780fb3
tripok.bat
7ce83fa4ede857ea60877effea3271224a6f6a59c2dfdfddd4feb383c4f39375 

Campaign 6
lebenslauf_2019_8_6.iso
a58c7f2ed08c8a1eac0a3aac50a0887bfdea69a7af83390fc5586dd75b42d022
lebenslauf_2019_8_6.img.lnk
848a669d612185bbcbff5392f41a0d2e4ddad8cc5c276ec313216f1724a153fa
URI:hxxp://185.82.202.66/rar.exe
Uri:hxxp://185.82.202.66/pork.rar

Campaign 7
Eml:445459f98d6c032ff3cdea3d8fb78d8d93f0cdd9d0d2d7a8653b2f953e4238d2
lebenslauf_2019_7_6.iso:
2a3ee52a465fa25bef9d2a96b1bb04eae31b6637b59ee1b9e2d69683b57b6888
Lebenslauf_2019_7_6.img.lnk:
E578ea331ff0ef23ea6334eb52f0fc110e6a5e11490e36d2e23c8b8cbde835e5
URI:hxxp://185.82.202[.]66/rar.exe
Uri:hxxp://185.82.202[.]66/zuoom.rar
Zuoom.rar:abc2d96986db822ff4d002cfde0adf772c9f72b611145a3345203c35f50a8b32
Zuoom.rar:c2b12300a6a01c2db44797b1e10a7735ca7d472b404a5beb393e66cdb129f179

Ransomware Strain
Campaign 8
Lebenslauf_2019_6_6.iso
E87e1b21fd2a93d96cc68f4ff8947836fa55dbd1e0d0e9f109efd7a0f42d3315
Fdb8c48d05285a49d77f5b9b123775fa8cf4307430d89087608736cb1181c727
7a83adfeccb1d8a07fe94f71fa347f068a80e8f4f4785a7d7cc1817b533c79e4
lebenslauf_2019_6_6.img.lnk
4508ce47e81cd01209afee9458c4e0e5071956cbee373138bb9678a25fadca15
5af03a143f4df5668414294a1aeb2eb9a5c4b6a391985d8611c4a809b1a7a737
D8389e061761d5de128b09e80cf1bf47efde21ca0bf07c038d802bb19b8fde98
Dedec7689f5cdc0931da2e9e6ab68e4843fe5ad0bb0699c771ce0a20ee954af5
f767f8bb1d1fe9b18e4b4f8d07b36d026a07db8f872cded59a5f7f6bc858c67d
URI:hxxp://185.106.120.31/rar.exe
URI:hxxp://185.106.120.31/trg.rar
trg.rar:19d3ca02ad8df7cffa65517ce95d52badeffed18dc35cc8db3351f583f1f3711
Lebenslauf_2019_6_6.jpe:
Dad4776d9458167fb081256b90273df5ac24ff6a99fb51718b08e6faba1b0691
brk.bat
3e7edc842702b6df90a3e86be2775b75574f3122e4d52a86fc6fd9da68b73f67
brtopi.bat
d6c4a85ea9e59bfd68d9041d8ea380dce210e7e45dd57f8da23199925c0123f6
URI:hxxp://185.106.120[.]31/ok

Campaign 9
eml:7c0aeaf5da11402b35ddb09d123c780f7b371f84720dfc6d28b1d80c62c427ce
lebenslauf_2019_5_6.iso
E72a7d2e17beb1dba799ad9891778f5ce0b2207978bc658d3826c041f5f0736c
lebenslauf_2019_5_6.img.lnk
442b37562aea6bebdce1be6b53ed7916e18f4b91b28b092a60acbeb1c46acab7
URI:hxxp://185.183.96[.]23/rar.exe
URI:hxxp://185.183.96[.]23/tog.rar
tog.rar:7bbb458e6579df29118174eb65579f6f02773e8ead9e89b65933191796774617
Trkop.vbs: 101f060edf89f4362ee6657acc110f88d3140090fb676620049a2407b503b837  yin1abtn.cq124aqq:cca91cc9bcf32f8bd9e2dddd0c001b4b4c4a83b812d4b30512fcb40f09b07403 
zapa.bat:7ce948f3b772b1829bf86cde37fa2f52916c5b1b5065b5207f7e1c2a423dd24e 

Rekt and NetSupport
January Campaign
ITW URL:hxxp://194.36.189[.]215/fnb.111
File name:fnb.111
sha256:C7d2abc2ff54556bec383afb05c5ae804d07a1fa171ea185c447d9f1e6a79746

Contacted URLs
hxxp://drive[.]google[.]com/uc?export=download&id=1SKyvgaq6-2z3ZqSJo2X-cAOvCBgl7VG-
hxxp://drive[.]google[.]com/uc?export=download&id=1w2zwPJGol7ucon-MMwrEj_CEH4B1_B8a
hxxp://drive[.]google[.]com/uc?export=download&id=11B6BFzAONrCIAZ2C8LKwR4aY34ZUpcqk

(The order of the hashes corresponds to the order URLs listed above)
NetSupport Zipped file: 4804edbbb8275cd465d7c1c520f97a1a5007f6234d4562a3ae9ed01110b429ce
Bat file:0cbaf48d543d06c838ad30e28b7cf92732a93e0507d3f3af4a7ab934890fe2fe
7z.exe (benign):c136b1467d669a725478a6110ebaaab3cb88a3d389dfa688e06173c066b76fcf

NetSupport Remote Administrative tool (abused binary)
e102806a9a136143e6ddead6bed5214ab4b71026c9a4eb26cc4b973f471b6c12
client32.ini:cb7e66d9eca17ce66c9241da97b85afaec01305820d86b1cd1528d4f6d72c966
C2:23.227.207[.]138:12233/fakeurl.htm 

February Campaign
ITW URL:hxxp://185.244.150[.]143/rrr.zzz
File name:rrr.zzz
sha256:df548114eb5b7a56c489f5239f66e0990e1ecacd20bcfff1b2bd677267362ad8

Contacted URLs
hxxp://drive[.]google[.]com/uc?export=download&id=1r_tfc9z3CLhC_R-x8xkw1hP4xHrAX6XE
hxxp://drive[.]google[.]com/uc?export=download&id=1oRpHhSrNdAJHO8rrSSEFFxlh4FP2LURp
hxxp://drive[.]google[.]com/uc?export=download&id=1YBCfBx7kxmT5bTMl8UgdsP9rm001OAp6

(The order of the hashes corresponds to the order URLs listed above)
Bat file:30bcc93e492c88032dd058c413e49c6cffa446f13d0311d5fb8980dbd923746b
NetSupport Zipped file: 0cbaf48d543d06c838ad30e28b7cf92732a93e0507d3f3af4a7ab934890fe2fe
7z.exe (benign):c136b1467d669a725478a6110ebaaab3cb88a3d389dfa688e06173c066b76fcf

NetSupport Remote Administrative tool (abused binary)
e102806a9a136143e6ddead6bed5214ab4b71026c9a4eb26cc4b973f471b6c12
client32.ini:cb7e66d9eca17ce66c9241da97b85afaec01305820d86b1cd1528d4f6d72c966
C2:23.227.207[.]138:12233/fakeurl.htm 

2019 Rekt Sample
itw:hxxp://juristlex.com/photo/photo88326635.scr
File name:photo88326635.scr
Sha256:d6c3f4b9b4b68e145238741750f3d2a5fad702192a8006c7cdebbf414a3e188d
Digital Signature serial number:75 DF 42 48 6D A0 6F 02 65 BE 10 98 04 D9 FB 13
Email address associated within digital signature:vanya.tanichew{at}mail.ru

Contacted URLs
hxxp://drive[.]google[.]com/uc?export=download&id=1s7I7GKwz22a7B72HIl2g_r9CDhfoGph2
hxxp://drive[.]google[.]com/uc?export=download&id=16zuLpHLv0nU3sCmFlz-4UfOS5bOw7P-k
hxxp://drive[.]google[.]com/uc?export=download&id=1IX7ox1rdGp53hGlWxgaYyh1fwhk8_SGr

Flawwed Ammy samples that shared the digital certificate properties
sha256:7ecfd68341fe276c17246dc51c5d70ee2c1bbc6801c85201c8a62956c23d872d
Sha256:56b57fc829774aa4423b7a29ff5a081b75167d2466898acbc7d89e717bfb4869
Digital Signature Serial number:00 F4 24 13 EE 41 08 72 60 A5 07 6D DA F1 C0 76 C5


1 comment:

  1. Question on User-Agent: "Mozilla / 5.0" <-- is it correct? Not "Mozilla/5.0" (without spaces)?

    ReplyDelete

The Gh0st Remains the Same

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